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Abstract 
Taking into consideration the underdevelopment of the Russian civil community it is of essential 
interest to touch upon local communities (known as TOS). Local governments and TOS 
communities could provide similar services and as such cooperate or compete with each other. 
Community initiatives could supplant poorly performing government services, or governments 
could outsource to communities some of its functions. Based on empirical Russian data, 
collected in the city of Kirov this research shows that the prevailing initial incentive to establish 
TOS is driven by the prospect of obtaining seed money from the government. We detected 
sources of TOS advantages over municipal authorities: ratio of costs and benefits, sensitivity to 
the demands of consumers, social capital, and voluntary nature of TOS. TOS are more likely to 
emerge in communities where people are sceptical about the efficacy of conventional 
mechanisms of democratic accountability, and prefer to collaborate with municipal governments 
on specific projects 
JEL Classification: L31, L33. 
Keywords: TOS, non-profit organization, efficiency, social capital, local authorities, civil 
community, Russia. 
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Local governments and local communities can provide similar services and as such 
cooperate or compete with each other. Community initiatives can supplant poorly performing 
government services, or governments can outsource to communities some of its functions. 
Today’s Russia features both of these patterns which can be observed in community self-
government projects. Communities self-government known in Russia as TOS (Territorialnoe 
Obshchestvennoe Samoupravlenie) which are an officially recognized institution which Russian 
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provides for the implementation of local community initiatives. Established in Russia in the early 
1990s as an apolitical form of community participation, TOS were expected to facilitate civic 
involvement in local affairs and pool the resources of government and civil society. Our paper 
assesses the performance and efficacy of this institution by using data collected in the city of 
Kirov. TOS are tools to improve environmental conditions and living conditions, and have been 
transformed into institutional structures which significantly expanded the scope of their activity. 
Today TOS include improving residential buildings and surroundings, supporting vulnerable 
social groups in the community, submitting plans and proposals on community development to 
local governments, assisting police in maintaining local safety and security, monitoring the 
performance of local utilities, and organizing recreational activities. (Shagalov, 2014).  
The level of the civic engagement in Russia is low. Taking into consideration this 
underdevelopment of the Russian civil community (Yakobson et al., 2011) and the urgent need 
to fill the vacuum of civil paternalism arising as a result of the Soviet regime (Vihavainen, 
2009), the importance of TOSs should not be erroneously deprecated. International experience 
shows that community grassroots involvement in local governance and participation in 
community affairs can facilitate community development (Putnam, 1993; Levi, 1996; Krishna, 
2002). These communities, established by local citizens of their own free will in order to realize 
their initiatives, perform functions, some of which intersect with the responsibilities of the 
municipal government (Shagalov, 2014). Thereupon, it is important to understand what part TOS 
play. What prompts people to form a TOS? How essential are grassroots initiatives in organizing 
TOS (are TOS demand- or supply-driven)? What are TOS comparative advantages over local 
governments? What are their advantages? What factors contribute to TOS efficiency? 
For several years the performance of TOS in the city of Kirov attracted the attention of 
the higher federal authorities and experts. There are over 200 TOSs in Kirov (pop. circa 
500,000), involving 4% of city residents and providing services to over 25%. Research into these 
communities shows the economic and social aspects of their establishment and their experience.  
In this paper the current state of territorial self-government communities within the local 
government, and their contribution into well-being of the local citizens is investigated. We are 
taking advantage of a large number of TOSs operating in the same city and hence in an identical 
environment while still producing different outcomes. This enables us to conduct statistical 
analyses to test various hypotheses about the creation, operation, and factors of the success and 
failures of TOS. 
As hypotheses, the following assumptions are made: the sources of TOS advantages are 
social capital; the ability of the communities to mobilize and consolidate resources of citizens, 
authorities, business structures; cost saving; more effective expenditure in comparison with the 
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municipal government, and also the voluntary nature of the establishment of these communities. 
An important factor encouraging the residents’ self-organization in TOS are the subsidies 
provided by the local authorities. Social capital with its variations is the essential requirement for 
the participation of citizens in TOS and the efficient operation of these communities. These 
assumptions are shown to be true in this paper. 
In the first part of this paper a diagram of areas of activities of TOS (TOS niches) is 
developed. Additionally we show that the prevailing initial incentive to establish TOS is driven 
by the prospect of obtaining seed money from the government. This triggers a “fund drive” 
multiplier and enables communities to eventually raise much higher project budgets. TOS are 
apolitical, they target specific community projects and almost never facilitate political collective 
action. In the second part based on surveys of local governmental officers, TOS service 
recipients, and the citizens of the city of Kirov (as a part of the scientific project of the Centre for 
Institutional Studies Higher School of Economics “Institutions, social capital and economic 
behaviour”), the sources of the efficiency of these communities in comparison with the state 
authorities have been singled out. A comparative list of sources of TOS efficiency in comparison 
with the local government is given. The most significant among them are the efficiency of the 
TOS communities in the ratio of costs and benefits, and sensitivity to the demands of consumers. 
The major factors among them are TOS operational efficiency regarding the ratio of costs and 
results, and their response to the needs of the consumers. Social capital is a critically important 
factor in TOS success. Very few TOS are government-created; most of them are grassroots 
initiatives which appear in response to the enabling legislation and initial availability of public 
funds. TOS are more likely to emerge in communities with a higher propensity for local 
collective action where people are skeptical about the efficacy of the conventional mechanisms 
of democratic accountability, and prefer to collaborate with municipal governments on specific 
projects 
TOS Niches 
The range of TOS powers is varied. In accordance with the current federal law TOS are a 
form of local government performed by the citizens independently; a type of non-profit 
organization. Therefore, their powers are defined institutionally. There are four responsibilities 
declared by the federal law (Federal Law No. 131): the representation of the interests of citizens 
residing on the territory of TOS; supporting decisions taken at the citizens’ meeting; carrying out 
activities to improve territories and other business activities in order to satisfy the social needs of 
citizens; the introduction of local bills into the local government. However, when analysing local 
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regulations, it was determined that the amount of TOS duties exceeds ten (Decree about TOS). 
Besides the four main types of activities, the legislator states powers to prepare and realize plans 
of social and economic development of territories; to support charity events; to assist law 
enforcement authorities in keeping the peace on the territory; to participate in work with children 
and teenagers by organizing their leisure activities in vacation time and creating children’s clubs 
and hobby groups; to participate in public events organized for territory improvement and 
cooperation with organizations of housing and utility sector; to inform citizens about the 
decisions of the local government; and to perform other responsibilities. An analysis of TOS 
work in Kirov shows that this list is not restricted to the ones mentioned above. Some of them 
are performed by TOS alone, though they refer to the competence of the municipal government, 
others coincide with the functions performed by the municipal authorities, for instance, powers 
to improve the city territory, work with children and teenagers, cooperation with organizations of 
housing and utility sector and informing the citizens. These types of activities are directly 
performed by both establishments. Why are some of the municipal functions performed by the 
non-profit organization, whose operation has voluntary nature? What are the niches of TOS 
activities? What are the main roles and purpose of TOS? To answer these questions we should 
refer to analysis of TOS work experience in Kirov.  
To evaluate the operation of non-profit organizations, the most popular type of data 
collection is a questionnaire survey of stakeholders (Balser, McClusky, 2005), (Brown, 2005), 
(Connolly, Conlon, Deutsh, 1980). This is connected with a lack of operation records of these 
organizations by official statistical bodies. Surveys allow researchers to include the opinions of 
various stakeholders or experts with knowledge of the operations of the organization. In this 
particular case three categories of respondents were surveyed: TOS managers, public servants 
and the citizens of the city who are users of TOS services. By means of random quota sampling 
100 TOS managers (that is, 100 communities), 104 local governmental officers and 300 citizens 
of the city (3 respondents for each TOS) were selected. At the time of research in 2013 there 
were 200 TOS communities registered in Kirov. The results of survey of TOS managers and 
citizens of TOS territories were used to evaluate the operational efficiency of the communities. 
While the local governmental officers were considered as experts which was determined by their 
work experience with the local citizens, and their answers were used to form general impressions 
of TOS operations. A comparison of the data defines the position of TOS in the city environment 
and municipal administration. 
In order to understand the nature of TOS operations it was necessary to compare whether 
TOS activities as defined by the legislation differ from the actually performed activities. Table 1 
shows the most popular and effective TOS according to the opinion of public servants, and an 
7 
 
aggregated estimation of the community efficiency provided by respondents (TOS managers, 
and the service users) in accordance with operation types, defined for TOS institutionally. 
Tab. 1. Activities of TOS communities (niches) and their efficiency 
Activities of TOS Where TOS should be 
most usefully engaged? 
(opinions of public 
servants)   
(in percentage points) 
How effective TOS 
are? (TOS managers, 
users of services)  
Improvement of community infrastructure  85 3,0 
Informing public on community issues and 
problems  
12 2,8 
Cultural and sports events 17 2,3 
Assisting police in maintaining public order 10 2,3 
Helping vulnerable people (children, seniors, 
veterans, the disabled and others) 
15 2,2 
Submission of regulatory and community 
development proposals to municipal 
governments 
5 2,0 
Participation in community development 
grant competitions 
51 - 
Monitoring local utilities and housing 
maintenance organizations  
20 - 
Appeals to local governments 10 - 
Control over local authorities 5 - 
Increase of civil engagement during elections 2 - 
Organization of protest movements and 
political meetings 
2 - 
Notes: allowed the choice of any number of responses. The estimation was performed by respondents by means of 
giving points on the scale from 1 to 4, where 1 – TOS is absolutely inefficient; 2 – TOS is inefficient;3 – TOS is 
efficient; 4 – TOS is very efficient).  
Practices of TOS that declared at effective law were highlighted in italics. 
 
The TOS activities with missing estimations of efficiency are not officially designated by 
the legislation and some of them was received during the field research based on the results of 
the respondent survey a posteriori, as half-closed questions were included into the questionnaire 
survey. Such activities are not basic of regular TOS operations therefore they could not be used 
to estimate efficiency. The exception is the participation of TOS in grant contests organized by 
the governmental authorities. In spite of being effective and on demand, this activity is more of a 
resource for TOS. Budgetary transfers provided by tender may be used by TOS managers to 
implement the declared powers.  
The estimations were performed by averaging responses which were given on a scale 
from 1 to 4. Table 1 shows that according to the opinion of all the three groups of respondents, 
the most effective TOS work is to improve community infrastructure and inform the public about 
community issues and problems. These two types of activities are rated significantly higher than 
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the others. We therefore define them as strategic. Local governmental officials also considered 
the monitoring of local utilities and housing maintenance organizations as strategic. This is an 
urgent issue because of issues within the housing and utility sectors (Shomina, 2010). However, 
it turned out to be impossible to evaluate this activity of TOS within this research.  
TOS operations directly connected with democratic values are worth particular attention. 
What is meant here is control over the operation of the public servants, an increase in civil 
engagement during elections and the organization of protest movements and political meetings. 
According to the opinion of the local governmental officials, these activities are not 
characteristic of TOS. The communities deal with local issues, arising in the process of daily life 
in neighbourhoods, districts, apartment blocks, but they do not discipline the local authorities. 
Their sphere of activity is restricted by the creation of favourable living environment for citizens. 
To prove this hypothesis let us refer to the respondents’ answers about TOS major operations 
(any number of variants was acceptable). TOS managers and the users of services answered this 
question (the answers of the first group are represented in dark grey colour, the answers of the 
other group are represented in light grey colour). Figure 1 demonstrates that both groups 
consider that TOS mostly deal with issues which the local government cannot afford to invest 
time or money in. TOS also unite citizens in cooperative work and TOS monitor the local 
authorities. 54% of surveyed TOS managers consider this work significant, whereas only 22% of 
residents do. This variety in answers may be connected with the low level of consolidation of 
citizens for coordinated problem solving, based on the respective interpersonal trust, social 
networks and common values. In other words, it may be connected with the low level of citizens’ 
social capital. It is known that social capital within private (that is, non-state) solutions to public 
issues reduces transaction expenses, allows citizens to support each other and cooperate within 
voluntary organizations. On the other hand, social capital materializes in the form of civic 
political activity in order to improve accountability and the work of the local authorities 
(Polishchuk, Menyashev, 2011). 
 
9 
 
 
Fig. 1. Distribution of answers to the question “What do you think is the main work of TOS?”  
(in percentage; any number of responses is allowed). 
 
Therefore, it may be affirmed with large degree of probability that TOS’s main work is 
not only creation of a favourable living environment for citizens on the respective territory, but 
also solving issues which are left unnoticed by the municipal government for some reason. TOS 
are apolitical; they target specific community projects and almost never facilitate political 
collective action. 
Trigger Incentives to Create TOS  
According to the results of the all Russian survey among civil servants in local 
government, carried out by Higher School of Economics in 2007–2008, during the monitoring of 
the condition of the civil society on the subject of “The analysis of municipal policies in the 
sphere of the support and development of public initiatives” it was stated that TOS embraces 
every third municipal entity. TOS are developing in 49% of urban districts, in 32% of urban 
settlements, in 29% of municipal districts and in 20% of rural settlements.  
Kirov is not an exception. In accordance with the official data, TOS communities in Kirov in 
2011 included 16,207 people (about 4% of citizens), whereas 126,095 people became service 
recipients, which was 25.3% of the total city population, and 225 business and non-commercial 
organizations were also included in the socialization process.  
Out of 200 Kirov TOS communities, registered by the Kirov city Duma during 2012, 
about 77% of Kirov TOSs were created in apartment blocks, where the form of management 
apartment blocs is the management company, 8% in settlements and 4% in villages. The analysis 
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of Kirov TOS shows that in 2008 there was only 1 TOS community, in 2011 there were 90 
communities, by October 2012 the number of officially registered TOS communities at place of 
residence increased to 198 (Administraciya goroda Kirova…, 2012). 
In spite of the popularity of TOS, the question about the factors encouraging individuals 
to self-organize into these communities has remained unanswered. In the long list of Russian and 
foreign scientific literature about the operation of non-profit organizations, including TOS, these 
factors have not been paid necessary attention. 
The survey among the TOS community managers and civil servants, carried out by the 
author of this research in 2013, describes the factors encouraging residents to establish TOS 
communities (Fig. 2). The survey analysed 50% of TOS registered in the city and 30 % of the 
local civil servants.  
 
 
Fig. 2. Distribution of the respondents answers to the question: “What, in your opinion, made 
residents of your territory establish TOS community?” (% of respondents, any number of 
responses is allowed). 
 
1 The possibility to exert pressure on local governments and managers of public utilities to 
improve their performance. 
2 The availability of financial support from local governments to implement community projects 
(area improvement/renovation; maintenance of communal facilities; landscaping, building 
children’s playgrounds, etc.). 
3 The decision of the local authorities to outsource some regulatory functions and service 
provision to communities. 
4 The opportunity to strengthen political bases for municipal elections. 
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5 The dissatisfaction of residents with the work of local authorities and an attempt to replace this 
with community initiatives. 
6 The possibility of solving local problems jointly with municipal authorities. 
 
73% respondents from the local civil servants and 78% TOS managers said that the major factor 
in establish TOS, was a desire to seek financial support from local governments to implement 
community projects. This is the common opinion of the respondents who are within the average 
subjective position of the income level, 39.2 % of those who responded “I have sufficient funds 
to buy food and clothing, but I cannot afford purchasing a fridge or a TV”, 54.5% of whom are 
people with higher education. It is remarkable that this variant of response was selected by the 
majority of the respondents, both the local civil servants and the regular citizens. This allows us 
to evaluate the integrity of the data.  
The second most important factor was the residents’ dissatisfaction with the work of local 
authorities and their attempt to replace this with community initiatives (21% of local civil 
servants and 22% of TOS managers). When selecting the third factor 28% of civil servants and 
15% of TOS managers said the desire of residents to exert pressure on local governments and 
managers of public utilities to improve their performance. Of the residents with a subjective 
income level higher than average (“I can afford purchasing a fridge or a TV-set, but cannot 
afford buying a new car”) 40%, and 60% of them  have a higher educational background.  
The desire to solve local issues by means of their own efforts and the local city budget 
(subsidies, grants), as it was announced by the TOS manager of the retirement age (58.9%) and 
the average income level, whereas the desire to attract the local authorities and organizations of 
the housing and utility sector to provide high-quality services was mostly expressed by 49% 
residents of employable age with a higher income level. They latter consider TOS as a 
mechanism to increase the accountability of the local authorities, whose resource is the social 
capital of citizens. This can improve the quality of the municipal administration. However, the 
majority of the surveyed respondents consider TOS to be a tool to solve local issues by means of 
their own efforts, therefore, supplementing, and sometimes substituting the power of the local 
authorities.  
The dominant desire of residents to improve the living facilities in their buildings and the 
surrounding territory by means of the local budget is likely to be connected with the condition of 
the housing stock in Kirov, the majority of which are physically rundown and require major 
refurbishment. The average age of the buildings where the respondents, TOS managers, live is 
31 years. 
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The Sources of TOS Advantages over the Municipal Government 
The efficiency of any organization depends on a number of factors. Shah and Anwar 
(2005) state that there are two peculiarities of governmental/ municipal efficiency: the response 
of the government to the citizens’ needs and operational efficiency (providing services of the 
necessary quality with minimum cost). La Porta et al. (1999) and Rothstein (Rothstein, Teorell, 
2008; Kumlin, Rothstein, 2005) support this opinion, including the successful provision of public 
benefits and the efficient use of funds into the concept “the efficiency of authorities”. Drucker 
(2003) described it as: “Efficiency is doing the thing right. Efficiency is doing the right thing”.  
Response to Citizens’ Needs 
First of all, we analyse TOS responses to citizens’ needs. Being a local organization, 
created by citizens, TOS communities are likely to respond more quickly to local requests. 
Residents of the TOS territory freely and with minimal cost (free time, transport charges, 
communication services, etc.) apply to the TOS manager, residing in their building, to solve any 
issues, thereby avoiding bureaucratic red tape in the governmental authorities. The TOS manager 
deals with the issue independently or by means of group action, or addresses it to the local 
authorities if the issue cannot be solved by standard group actions or requires significant funding. 
For instance, residents can easily organize community clean-up days or plant ornamental bushes, 
although complex asphalt paving of the territory will be more challenging for residents. Dealing 
with challenging local issues in most cases will depend on the level and type of social capital 
accumulated in such communities (Putnam, 1993; Tabellini, 2008, 2009; Aghion at al., 2010). 
Minimizing the costs, when applying to TOS, is possible when there is trust among people, 
stable social values, rules and social networks. These particular elements make the basis of social 
capital. For effective group actions the society should have civic culture, which refers to a type 
of social capital “bridging social capital” (Menyashev, Polischuk, 2011). Bridging social capital 
can create numerous social coalitions to provide public benefits. It is provided by a wide range of 
trust among people and universal morality. In turn, civic culture is based on common norms and 
values, which enable citizens to participate by following common interests (Almond, Verba, 
1963; Weingast, 1997). Civic culture is essential for proper democratic performance (Persson, 
Tabellini, 2009); it turns individuals into “sophisticated consumers of politics” (Boix, Posner, 
1998) driven by properly understood self-interest properly. Prevalence of “civic voters” 
(Nannicini et al., 2012) ensures government accountability and prevents abuses of power. As a 
result, the community possessing enough bridging social capital and civic culture is able to 
minimize the costs of the interrelations among individuals, be more sensitive to the local 
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residents and deal with local issues by means of group actions. In this case, if our hypothesis is 
correct, TOS are better informed about the current local situation and, therefore, are better able 
to provide services in accordance with the citizens’ needs. However, due to the theoretical 
aspects given above, these services must be of proper quality, and TOS operation must be 
efficient. 
Social Capital as Factor of TOS Performance 
Thus, points of TOS efficiency are determined; what is left is to ascertain what enables 
the provision of services of good quality (Tab. 1). For this purpose let us turn to the research of 
Shagalov (Shagalov, 2014) on the performance of citizen self-organization at their place of 
residence. Besides questions about the quality of TOS services, the questionnaire survey 
included questions about solidarity, mutual assistance, and the ability to work in groups. 
Questions about trust and feelings of responsibility towards your family, neighbours, micro-
region residents (that is, rural settlements), city citizens in general and trust in the local 
authorities were also included here. Respondents could equally assess these indicators giving 
points from 1 to 5. Questions of these group characterize bridging, bonding social capital and 
civic culture (Polishchuk, Menyashev, 2011), and the endogenous ability of a respective 
community for group actions. 
If group actions do not go beyond narrow groups, striving for special privileges (Olson 
groups), we are dealing with social capital in a bonding form; group actions within vast public 
coalitions (Putnem groups) require bridging social capital. Civic culture is a feeling of 
responsibility and immersiveness in the current state of affairs in community. Bridging social 
capital, as a rule, supports development, whereas bonding social capital can be an obstacle, 
diverting resources and energy from the community to a fight for the redistribution of rent 
(Polishchuk, Menyashev, 2011). Bridging social capital was supposed to answer the questions 
about the trust in residents of the micro-region, settlement, city as a whole, whereas the bonding 
one dealt with issues of trust to family members, building residents, feeling of responsibility to a 
narrow circle of people (Glaeser et al., 2000). Specific social capital was stipulated by answers 
about the quantity of residents frequently participating in the community meetings, and corporate 
social capital, demonstrated in the system of the social bonds of TOS community, as a social 
organization with other organizations (business / non-profit), involved in its operation (Todeva & 
Knoke, 2002), and the number of organizations involved in TOS operation.  
The third group combines general questions about the TOS community, its form, the 
number of residents living on its territory, the number of members in the community 
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administration, the size of the TOS budget, TOS territorial belonging to the city district, and the 
presence or absence of the managing company or Condominium Partnership on its territory.  
Finally, the fourth group combines questions, describing individual characteristics of the 
TOS manager such as age, gender, marital status, income and educational background. This 
indicates not only work quality of the TOS managers but also the frequency of their participation 
in the community work in accordance with the abovementioned value range, describing the work 
quality of the TOS manager. 
A regression analysis of the data determined the factors contributing to TOS efficiency 
(Tab. 2). The strongest positive influence on TOS performance is the specific social capital, 
represented by the number of residents participating in TOS meetings, residents assisting each 
other, and the wait for assistance from residents. The second significant factor is civic culture, 
expressed in the feeling of civil liability for one’s city. A less important factor influencing 
performance in a positive way is corporate social capital, which is identified in the system of 
social bonds of TOS community as a social organization with other organizations (business or 
non-profit) involved in its operation. Values and norms unconditionally shared by organizations 
generate trusting relationships, providing the efficient operation of the social organization. 
Another factor is quality of the community manager’s work, and his active participation in social 
activity. Bonding social capital, expressed in the feeling of civil responsibility and trust in family 
members adversely affects TOS communities performance in all presented regression models. 
Therefore, the key factor of the non-profit organization performance is social capital and 
its varieties, which leads to the residents’ group actions (Tab. 2). Borisova (2014) expresses the 
same opinion in her work. Analysing homeownership performance in Russia  Borisova 
concludes that homeowners with homogeneous groups of residents work more efficiently; 
implying similar views on a number of questions, which makes it possible to make a quick 
decision. Also, homeownership where residents find it easier (quicker) to come to an agreement 
during meetings and residents have fewer conflicts among themselves are more efficient. She 
points out the leading role of social capital in the process. Yau (2010) got similar results in the 
process of applying a case study. Owners of residential blocks of flats keep common property in 
good quality, if there is a good level of social capital among residents.  
 
 
3 
 
Tab. 2. Factors contributing to the performance of TOS communities 
Notes: Model uses linear regression. Results show linear regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01. 
 
 
 
TOS performance 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Bonding social capital 
 
-0,226 
(0,077) 
 
-0,226 
(0,077) 
 
-0,226 
(0,077) 
 
-0,226 
(0,077) 
 
-0,227 
(0,068) 
 
-0,180 
(0,069) 
 
Leadership of TOS manager 
  
0,140 
(0,082) 
 
0,139 
(0,082) 
 
0,130 
(0,079) 
 
0,121 
(0,072) 
 
0,113 
(0,071) 
 
Generalized trust 
   
0,028 
(0,079) 
 
0,028 
(0,075) 
 
0,032 
(0,069) 
 
0,025 
(0,068) 
 
Civic culture 
    
  0,300** 
(0,075) 
 
0,299** 
(0,069) 
 
 0,261* 
(0,069) 
 
Specific social capital 
     
  0,374*** 
(0,069) 
 
     0,330*** 
(0,070) 
 
Corporate social capital 
      
 0,206* 
(0,140) 
 
Number of respondents 
 
100 
 
100 
 
100 
 
100 
 
100 
 
100 
 
R
2
 
 
0,051 
 
0,071 
 
0,071 
 
0,161 
 
0,301 
 
0,338 
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Voluntary Self-organization of Residents 
Borisova underlines that homeowner TOS are efficient only if they are created at the 
initiative of the building residents, not imposed by the authorities. Then the voluntary 
participation of citizens in TOS may become an advantage over the enforcing nature of the state. 
According to Levi (1996) care must be taken with the interference of the state, as it may spoil 
people’s ability to spontaneously self-organize. Mersiyanova (2010) says in a number of Russian 
cities there is a transformation in the operation of TOS communities. The local authorities 
restrict self-organization. Community operations have changed from volunteer to obligatory, and 
the realization of the community’s own initiatives has been replaced by realization of city 
programmes. 
However, the statistical evidence of this transformation in Russian cities was not given. 
Because of this, the answer to the question about volunteer or obligatory form of TOS operation 
has not yet been found. The research, in terms of which TOS managers have been surveyed, 
draws conclusions about the established tendency.  
46% of respondents answered the question “who initiated your TOS community” in the 
following way: the community is established thanks to the group initiative of the building 
residents; 41% of respondents mentioned that it became possible due to the individual initiative 
of the TOS manager, and only 7% of respondents announced that the community was established 
by efforts of the local authorities (Fig. 3). Individual initiative means that the community is 
established by efforts of one individual, who becomes the head. Collective initiative means the 
TOS establishment by the number of actions of a group of individuals. Initiative for TOS 
establishment belonging to the local authorities, implied active interference of the local 
authorities in the process of TOS establishment. Therefore, in the majority of cases TOS are 
established voluntarily. 
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Fig. 3. Distribution of answers to the question: “Whose initiative was your community created 
by?” (points in percentage, choice of any number of responses is allowed) 
 
The specific feature of governmental and municipal organizations, presented in the 
research of Alchian and Demsetz (1972), is the involuntary nature of their ownership. The 
owners are taxpayers, who are not able to wriggle out of the responsibilities of supporting state 
and municipal property. In such organizations it is challenging for taxpayers to control 
management activity of the government agencies. Therefore, the voluntary nature of TOS not 
only allows citizens to control the efficient distribution of TOS resources and municipal 
resources, but also provides their sustainable use, improves the service quality of TOS by the 
local authorities. All this leads to the improved functioning and development of the city 
economy. 
TOS Budget and Multiplying Seed Money 
The abovementioned sources of efficiency lack one significant detail—the funds which 
help TOS realize their initiatives. The research results of TOS efficiency have not proved a 
strong connection between the efficiency variable and investments in TOS budgets. 
Nevertheless, it would be inappropriate to leave this issue untouched. TOS budget analysis can 
detect who sets it and how this is done. The efficient implementation of funds is one of 
productivity indicators of the organization operation. So, where do the funds come from to 
realize civic initiatives? How efficiently these funds are implemented?  
A questionnaire survey of TOS managers described the budget structure of such societies. 
During the survey respondents responded to the following: “Point out the sources and amount of 
cash inflow into TOS budgets”. The results of respondents’ answers are given in Table 3. To 
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provide the completeness and consistency of answers respondents were asked to point out cash 
inflow amount in percentages, not giving the full amount in roubles. 
Tab. 3. Sources and Volume of Earnings in TOS Budget  
Sources of cash inflow  
in the TOS budget  
The size of cash inflow 
 in the TOS budget (%) 
Funds of the residents’ From 10 to 30  
City administration budget More than 50 
Regional administration budget More than 50 
Commercial organizations' funds No more 10 
 
As can be seen in this table, the significant part of the TOS budget is made by cash inflow 
from the regional administration and the city administration. To a lesser extent, residents’ own 
funds are represented—10 to 30% of total budget amounts. Business organizations make the 
least contribution to TOS budgets, i.e. less than 10%. In accordance with the Federal Law on the 
local government and regulatory documents, controlling TOS operation in the city of Kirov, 
regional and local authorities are entitled to subsidize the societies by tender. Therefore, there are 
many grant contests in the city to support local initiatives. They allow TOS to realize an idea, 
(e.g. landscaping outer territory of the building), in the form of a social project, for which they 
may apply for a grant. For a winning project, the TOS count on the financial support of the 
current authorities. Judging by Kirov experience, such support is given if there is demand for the 
project by the residents, and if the residents themselves and business organizations also 
contribute funds. In most cases this TOS budget structure is explained by the grant contest 
conditions. In accordance with them the amount of the contestant’s contribution into the project 
must be no less than 30% of the requested sum (Administraciya goroda Kirova…, 2012). The 
same applies to the contribution of business organizations, which must be no less than 10% of 
the sum of municipal or regional grant. Such budget distribution may change to a larger or 
smaller amount depending on whether the TOS applies for grants, and on whether the TOS 
manager works effectively with organizations situated on the TOS territory. Besides, stringent 
conditions for grants encourage the search for partners in realizing a social project. 
Since 2007 grants supporting social initiatives have been given in three areas: “my city is 
my home” (improvement of citizens’ places of residence); “our heritage” (organizing resident’s 
recreation activities and preserving cultural heritage sites); “civic initiative” (projects of TOS 
system development in forums and seminars informing citizens about realization of TOS social 
initiatives, etc.). The first of these nominations each year attracts strong interest with the city 
citizens. During six-year period of the citizens’ participation 289 children playgrounds and 
sports-grounds have been built on territory of residential buildings, and within the scope of other 
6 
 
nominations dozens of charity and social events have been organized to support veterans, multi-
child families, the sick, and the lonely people. 
TOS operations seem local, such societies act within their territories. Judging by the data 
in the city of Kirov, in the majority of cases TOS territory is restricted to an apartment block and 
the outer territory of the building (Shagalov, 2014). Nevertheless, such residents’ societies may 
be of mass proportions and in some cases they include entire micro-regions and rural settlements.  
However, the subsidizing of social initiatives often does not reflect the efficiency of such 
institutional interaction. It is also reasonable to present indicators of economic return efficiency 
from TOS operations. What is meant here is the profitability of budget investments, attracted per 
unit of non-budget ones. For example, in 2010 per 3 million roubles from government budget 
funds provided to realize social initiatives, 5 million roubles of funds from third party 
organizations were attracted, including funds of the residents themselves. In 2011 per 4 million 
roubles from budget funds, there were 6.3 million roubles from third party organizations and an 
additional 1.5 million roubles from other budget sources (Tab. 4). 
In this case calculation of profitability ratio of budget investment in the development of 
public societies seems reasonable. The profitability formula is: 
    (1) 
where Rib t is profitability ratio of budget investments in the reviewed period, Ii is the amount of 
third party investment, Ib is amount of government budget investment. Therefore, in 2011 the 
profitability ratio value is the following:  
   (2) 
consequently, the profitability of budget investments in 2011 was 95%; per 1 rouble of budget 
funds there were 1.9 roubles of other funds. Such simple calculations, first of all, show the 
efficiency of economic collaboration between political institutions and institutions of civic 
society and business, which is circumstantial proof of the existence of trust between these 
institutions. Societies at place of residence are becoming the basis for establishing trust, defined 
by conditions, created by local government with the purpose of their future evolution. The 
profitability of budget investments is an economic indicator, demonstrating the efficiency of 
implementing funds from the city budget and initiating the intended expenditure of funds in the 
sector working with citizens.  
Tab. 4. Comparative Data of Grant Contests to Support Social Initiatives in 2007 – 2012  
Indicator 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Applications filed 20 47 51 66 56 127 
 / 100%,ib t i bR I I 
 2011 7,8/ 4,0 100% 195%,ibR   
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Projects winners 15 29 51 54 55 119 
Involved in the project, 
people.  
500 1347 4681 4890 4956  
Number of beneficiaries, 
people. 
  81 333 104 747 126 095  
The number of 
organizations involved in 
the implementation of 
projects 
27 42 181 186 225  
Budget funds allocated for 
projects city 
administration, mln. rub. 
0, 650 1 3 3 4 8 
In addition, funds raised to 
the implementation of 
projects, mln. rub. 
0,667 1,4 4 5 6,3  
The funds of the district 
administrations, mln. rub. 
  0,741 0,2 0,2  
The funds of Deputies, 
mln. rub. 
  1,2 1,9 1,3  
In total, mln. rub. 1,3 2,4 8,9 10 11,8  
Source: Report on the administration of the city of Kirov in 2012 (http://www.mo-
kirov.ru/). 
 
Subsidies, in the form of municipal grants, make up the essential part of all the funds, 
assigned for realizing the project, and positively influence fund raising and increase the share of 
the partnership contribution (Andreoni, 1998). As we know the prevailing initial incentive to 
establish TOS is driven by the prospect of obtaining seed money from the government. This 
triggers a “fund drive” multiplier and enables communities to eventually raise much higher 
project budgets. 
In addition to the financial values of grants used to evaluate TOS efficiency, a number of 
other factors can be given, showing project effectiveness and their social popularity. The values, 
given in Table 4, show that the vast majority of the population is involved in social projects. 
Further there are positive dynamics of the abovementioned values annually. Another indicator is 
the interest of large and small municipal authorities (such as Samara, Lipetsk, Perm, Nizhny 
Novgorod) in the local authorities of Kirov in order to adopt the positive experiences of TOS 
societies for development of their own systems of the local government. 
The results achieved in Kirov have received high praise at the national level. In 
December 2009 in Moscow there was an awards ceremony for winners of the annual Contest of 
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municipal authorities, organized by the Ministry for regional development of the Russian 
Federation. Kirov took 3rd place in nomination “The best practice stimulating civic 
engagement”. The effectiveness of the project activity is closely connected with public demand 
(Administraciya goroda Kirova…, 2012).  
First of all, public demand for projects is determined by the expert council of the city 
grant contest, which includes representatives of the local authorities and public organizations. 
The decision is based on the decision of the territory residents, who the project is meant for, of 
the necessity of its realization. The decision of residents is included in project documentation and 
directly influences approval or otherwise of the project by experts. Notwithstanding these 
positive results, a detailed analysis of the positive characteristics of the realized social projects 
and an examination of public opinion allows the assessment of TOS society operations despite 
the fact that at present this research is hindered due to the lack of the necessary empirical data 
being available to the public.  
To sum up, judging from this information, TOS budget structures combine funds of the 
local residents, grants of the authorities, and funds of private companies. The operation of TOS 
contributes to the raising of these funds. Social projects are becoming a target for the purpose of 
which funds or resources of the interested parties are raised. All of the resources, coming to 
TOS, undergoes financial evaluation by the TOS manager. It is not at all necessary for the 
project partner or residents to support help or participate in TOS, contributing any monetary 
funds. Help may be given providing transport services, supplying building and construction 
materials and so on. For instance, in accordance with a clause on the grant application residents’ 
own contribution to realization of social projects include purchasing equipment (spades, rakes, 
brushes, etc.), purchasing equipment and facilities for the outer garden (playgrounds, benches, 
etc.), purchasing building and construction materials, purchasing planting stock (young tree 
plants, ornamental shrubs), volunteer work, prizes and souvenirs for social and cultural events. 
The unremunerated contribution of  residents  allows an adjustment stimulation system in such a 
way that all the parties should be interested in following the contract provisions not only at the 
moment of its signing, but also at the moment of its execution. The risk of possible losses 
constrains opportunist behaviour and increases social responsibility for the provided service. 
The person responsible for finding partners and organizations to participate in the project 
(both direct and indirect participation), is the TOS manager. This helps reduce expenses, which 
are bound to appear when using municipal authorities. These are the transaction expenses ex-
ante (Alchian, Demsetz, 1972; Williamson, 1985; Kapeliushnikov, 1990), appearing prior to 
signing the contract between two agents. Here it refers the following: finding contractors (such a 
search using the municipal authorities lasts for the period not less than 3 months), preparation 
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and signing the contract for service provision (e.g., city land improvement), the estimation of the 
social demand to conduct relative work and so on. All the abovementioned types of activities 
demand significant funds and time. TOS optimizes this work, reducing such red-tape expenses to 
a minimum. Budget subsidizing of TOS is cost-effective. Therefore, no doubt, all these facts are 
a significant advantage in TOS operations in comparison with the local government.  
Grassroots Monitoring of Following the Rules 
Conducting any TOS activity related to social investments is always divided into two 
steps. First, is the realization of this or that activity directed to create a positive environment for 
residents (within the contract or any other agreement). Second, is the activity directed to support 
the previously received results (established playgrounds, sports grounds, organized events, other 
improvement facilities, etc.). In both cases the most significant part is the monitoring of the 
current rules of contracts, agreements or values. When analysing the state authorities in terms of 
formal institutions, they have special duty bearers, whose major activity is the monitoring of the 
current rule. One of the formal institutions is law, which is controlled by the state. Formal 
institutions seem to be efficiently implemented, as their duty bearers must do the only thing 
required—monitor the following the rules. However, many do not take into consideration that for 
a specialized duty bearer monitoring is only a means of earning money. Therefore, money may 
be earned another way—turning a blind eye in exchange for some preferences.  
For TOS, which contains both formal and informal institutions (e.g., an TOS which has 
not undergone the procedure of official registration, having common values for residents), any 
individual can be a duty bearer considering that the rules accepted in the society must be 
followed. Therefore, in case of rule infringement the rule breaker is unlikely to be able to bribe 
their way out and avoid punishment. Duty bearers, noticing a rule infringement, consider 
following the rule to be a social value and are not ready to give it up. This is the so-called 
evidence principle of breaking contract conditions, when rule infringements come out in the 
open, which, together with the risk of reputation loss and financial losses, significantly restricts 
actions of potential deviants. The social capital of TOS societies is aimed at the distribution and 
strengthening of public control, whose trust and values create a powerful stimulus for an 
effective interconnection of individuals. It reduces expenses of opportunist behaviour of the 
principal, agent and sub-agent. 
The disadvantage of such an informal monitoring has always been a lack of resources to 
track rule offenders regularly. However, in micro societies at place of residence, the small sizes 
of the organizations allow the monitoring of the rules. Therefore, TOS can efficiently and 
without delay, monitor of duty performance by the third parties, for instance, by a contractor 
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responsible for the improvement of the outer territory, or by the TOS managers. This monitoring 
is implemented both at the ex-ante stage, and in the process of TOS operation ex-post stage 
(Williamson, 1985). All this helps reduce transaction expenses connected with duty 
performance. 
What Makes TOSs More Likely? 
However, what encourages people to perform socially oriented operations? What are the 
conditions for TOS existence? The answers to these questions are provided by the results of the 
questionnaire survey among the residents of Kirov as a part of the scientific project of the Centre 
for Institutional Studies Higher School of Economics “Institutions, social capital and economic 
behaviour”, carried out by Polishchuk and the author of this research in 2014. There was the total 
of 3000 respondents selected from residents living in apartment blocks by means of random 
representation sampling. 24.2% of the respondents were residents of a building or territory where 
TOS communities were established.  
Respondents were asked questions characterizing social capital and group actions: about 
the level of trust between the residents of their building and the city as a whole, the feeling of 
responsibility for their building, surrounding territory and the city, the frequency of participation 
in a community clean-up day, providing help to neighbours, and how well they know their 
neighbours. The questionnaire survey included questions about individual characteristics of 
respondents, describing their gender, age, educational background, income level, city district, 
where the respondent resides. They were also asked if they assumed the state of things in the city 
depended on such citizens as themselves and what was a better way to solve issues in the life of 
the citizens. The two latter variables together with the information about the city district where 
the respondent resides, were used as dummy variables as they were nominal and ordinal.  
The variable for the establishment of an TOS in a residential building was represented in 
the analysis as binary and selected as dependent. All the other questions were selected as 
regressors in accordance with the hypothesis that the major reason for the residents’ participation 
in TOS is social capital. A logistical regression model was built, which describes the given 
hypothesis (Tab. 5) more closely. The analysis of the model showed that the most significant 
condition for TOS establishment in a residential building is the degree of acquaintance of the 
respondent with the neighbours and the frequency their communication. 
Tab. 5. Explaining conditions of TOS existence  
Dependent binary variable: 
Existence of TOS in the residential building  
(0 – TOS not exist; 1 – TOS exist) 
Degree of acquaintance with the neighbours and .29*** 
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communication with them (.05) 
Trust among city residents .27*** 
(.06) 
Mutual help .24*** 
(.06) 
Income level .21*** 
(.05) 
Trust only to the house residents  -.24*** 
(.06) 
I cannot influence the situation in my city 
 
.44*** 
(.12) 
I feel responsibility for my building and 
surrounding area 
.17** 
(.05) 
I seek collaboration with local authorities in 
solving community problems  
.34** 
(.11) 
Constant -3.998 
(.34) 
-2 Log likelihood 
Nagelkerke R square 
2654.900 
.125 
Notes: Model uses binary logistic regression. Results show binary logistic regression coefficients with standard 
errors in parentheses. *p<.10  **p<.05  ***p<.01. 
  
The better you know your neighbours, the more chances you have to create TOS. The 
next by importance is the level of trust among city residents. A high level of trust in the majority 
of people influences group actions positively. Trust only to the building residents (a narrow 
group of people) has a negative influence on TOS and decreases the chances of their 
establishment. The positive effect is rendered by social capital characteristics such as mutual 
help and the citizens’ feeling of responsibility for their building and the surrounding area. The 
income level plays an important role as well. High income creates beneficial conditions to solve 
local issues actively within TOS.  
The regression model shows that TOS are connected with the specific treatment of the 
local authorities by the citizens. So, residents of the TOS territory assume that they cannot 
influence the situation in the city. They prefer to solve the city issues in collaboration with the local 
authorities but not by controlling them. This fact can be explained by the prevalence of bonding 
social capital among the respondents, which are expressed in the responsibility for their own 
building and the surrounding grounds only, and knowing and providing support for their 
neighbours.  
Conclusion 
Empirical data about TOS, gathered in Kirov, show a strong demand for TOS from the 
municipal authorities and the local residents. In the federal law of the local authorities TOS is 
mentioned in the meaning of organization, established with the purpose of solving issues of local 
significance. The term “organization” is associated with state and municipal organization, 
12 
 
included in the structure of the public authorities. At the same time, the essential principles of the 
establishment and conduct of TOS are voluntary participation and self-organization. Therefore, it 
is quite probable that local authorities consider TOS to be some extension of the vertical power 
structure. However, survey data of TOS managers illustrate the opposite. Respondents point out 
the voluntary nature of these societies establishment. Very few TOS are government-created. As 
Alchian and Demsetz (1972) show, the distinguishing feature of state and municipal 
organizations is their non-voluntary nature. The owners are tax payers, who are not liable to 
wriggle out of responsibilities to keep state and municipal property. In such organizations it is 
difficult to manage the operations of the local authorities for and on behalf of tax payers. 
Therefore, the voluntary nature of TOS not only allows the citizens to control the efficient 
distribution of resources of TOS and municipal authorities, but also to provide their efficient use, 
increase the quality of TOS services and the services of municipal authorities. All this leads to 
better results in operation and development of the city economics. 
We found that the prevailing initial incentive to establish TOS is driven by the prospect of 
obtaining seed money from the government. This triggers a “fund drive” multiplier and enables 
communities to eventually raise much higher project budgets. Most of TOS are grassroots 
initiatives which come about in response to the enabling legislation and the initial availability of 
public funds which serves as a catalyst for community initiatives. TOS are apolitical, they target 
specific community projects and almost never facilitate political collective action. As a result, 
TOS illustrate the ability to use mobilized funds more effectively in comparison with local 
authorities. This ability may be connected with the leadership of the TOS manager, which turned 
out to be crucial according to the results of the regression analysis. At the same time TOS can 
minimize transactional expenses which are inevitable in the operation process of bureaucracy; 
ex-ante and ex-post expenses, and also control over TOS operation results by the local residents. 
The localization of societies and social capital allows the establishment of such controls. 
Another essential conclusion in this research is detected sources of TOS advantages over 
municipal authorities. One of them is their response to the citizens’ needs. Social capital plays a 
significant role here, which has become a factor of operation performance for TOS. Important 
varieties of social capital include specific social capital, civic culture and corporate social capital. 
Bonding social capital adversely affects TOS communities performance. 
Despite TOS operational advantages, for consistency it is fair to refer to the analysis of 
TOS operation experience in other cities and regions. However, the main difficulty of such 
research is the absence of information about TOS operation in full. 
An analysis of the empirical data showed that the establishment of TOS in a residential 
building and its existence is facilitated by bonding social capital, which nourishes this kind of 
13 
 
community and restricts resident group actions only by the territory of their building, and does 
not perform actions for the benefit of the whole city population. Therefore, residents of the TOS 
territory tend to assume that the situation in the city hardly ever depends on them, as their power 
is restricted. They prefer to solve the city issues in collaboration with the local authorities 
without controlling them. In other words TOS are more likely to emerge in communities with a 
higher propensity for local collective action, where people are sceptical about the efficacy of 
conventional mechanisms of democratic accountability, and prefer to collaborate with municipal 
governments on specific projects. In spite of this, the respective level of trust in the majority of 
the city, acquaintance with the neighbours and mutual support provide a significant basis for 
TOS establishment and implication for creation of various citizenship coalitions. 
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